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Abstract
The question of how altruism can evolve despite its local disadvantage to selfishness has produced
a wealth of theoretical and empirical research capturing the attention of scientists across
disciplines for decades. One feature that has remained consistent through this outpouring of
knowledge has been that researchers have looked to the altruists themselves for mechanisms by
which altruism can curtail selfishness. An alternative perspective may be that just as altruists want
to limit selfishness in the population, so may the selfish individuals themselves. These alternative
perspectives have been most evident in the fairly recent development of enforcement strategies.
Punishment can effectively limit selfishness in the population, but it is not free. Thus when
punishment evolves amongst altruists, the double costs of exploitation from cheaters and
punishment make the evolution of punishment problematic. Here we show that punishment can
more readily invade selfish populations when associated with selfishness, whereas altruistic
punishers cannot. Thereafter, the establishment of altruism due to enforcement by selfish
punishers provides the ideal invasion conditions for altruistic punishment, effectively creating a
transition of punishment from selfishness to altruistic. Thus, from chaotic beginnings, a little
hypocrisy may go a long way in the evolution and maintenance of altruism.
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Introduction
The evolution of altruism has intrigued scientists for over a century, resulting in numerous
theories and debates that have been both complimentary and competitive, often resembling
the topic of study itself (eg, Nowak et al. 2010, Abbot et al. 2011). Despite the outward
appearance of dissimilar, competing theoretical frameworks, in the end, altruism can evolve
despite being at a local disadvantage to selfish strategies (i.e. multilevel selection, see
Wilson and Wilson 2007). Generally, researchers look to the altruists themselves for
mechanisms by which selfishness can be curtailed. This is not surprising as the competition
between altruism and selfishness may be influenced by our own humanity, driving
researchers to seek out ways the good prevail over the evil. Despite this way of thought,
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another possibility may exist, one by which the selfish limit selfishness, thus maintaining
altruism in the population (Eldakar et al. 2007, Eldakar and Wilson 2008).
The concept of selfishness as a self-limiting strategy was first suggested to us by an
empirical study on humans showing that individuals most likely to punish cheaters were also
most tempted to cheat (Eldakar et al. 2006), and later supported by its observed presence
across societies (Herrmann et al. 2008). Although the concept of the maintenance of altruism
by selfishness may appear paradoxical, examples of this relationship are abundant in both
human and non-human social groups. For example, in non-human primates leading members
of dominance hierarchies receive proportionately greater benefits from the group, yet often
pay proportionately greater costs in maintaining the social order (de Waal 1989, Boehm
1999, Flack et al. 2005, 2006) (here we consider dominants as selfish due to performing
self-serving behaviors while restricting such behaviors in subordinates). Furthermore, in
groups not confounded by power asymmetries associated with hierarchies, those that punish
transgressors are also likely transgressors themselves. For example, in the tree wasp
(Dolichovespula sylvestris), individuals that police worker laid eggs and reduce overall
cheating are also those most likely to cheat by laying eggs, earning the term “corrupt
policing” (Wenseleers et al. 2005). In addition, Scrub Jays (Aphelocoma coerulescens) most
defensive of the theft of food caches are also those most likely to steal caches from others
(Emery and Clayton 2001). A similar dynamic may even play out within multicellular
organisms, as cancerous tumors have been shown to restrict the growth of other tumors
(Camphausen et al. 2001, Guba et al. 2001).
Similar scenarios have also existed throughout the history of human societies. Castillians/
knights of the middle ages were initially considered thugs that took resources from
defenseless civilians, yet at the same time defended those very same civilians from the
exploitation of others (Bison 1994). Modern examples of this relationship include the Mafia,
by which crime rates are kept exceedingly low, increasing the local prosperity and
benefiting the majority of those in their region (Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995, Lupo 2009).
Furthermore, studies on resource control and aggression find similar strategies present even
in preschoolers. Socially dominant children with high moral cognition (understanding of
rules) were able to control resources through the manipulation of their peers, thus promoting
overall moral behavior while also using it to their own advantage (see, Hawley and Geldhof
2012).
Enforcement does not always entail corruption and exploitation; indeed the theory of
altruistic punishment (also sometimes known as moralistic punishment and strong
reciprocity) posits that enforcement behavior is performed by altruists rather than cheaters
(eg, Bowles and Gintis 2002, 2004, Boyd et al. 2003). This perspective is apparent in the
vast majority of research on punishment in humans (see Fehr and Gachter 2000, Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003, Gintis et al. 2003). Furthermore, punishers are often revered, such that
punishers experience greater rewards and favor by those group members in which they
protect (Barclay 2006), which leads to the inevitable question of whether some motivations
of altruistic punishment are actually altruistic.
The evolutionary role of punishing selfishness is straightforward; it reduces the within group
advantage of selfishness over altruism. Although punishment is effective, it is not free; it
costs time, resources and generates risk. Non-punishers, on the other hand, benefit from
punishment but do not share in the costs, qualifying punishment as a form of second-order
altruism and non-punishment as a form of second-order free-riding. Thus, a major issue with
the evolution of punishment is identical to the original problem of altruism; how punishers
prevail when facing exploitation from non-punishers (Yamagishi 1986, Bowles and Gintis
2002, 2004, Boyd et al. 2003, Fehr 2004, Panchanathan and Boyd 2004, Eldakar and Wilson
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2008). In the typical formulation, selfishness wins within groups and altruism wins between
groups (see review, Wilson and Wilson 2007), and the same applies for selfish and altruistic
punishers. Specifically, Eldakar et al. (2007) demonstrated that when propensity to
cooperate and the propensity to punish noncooperators were modeled as continuous,
independent traits, over time a negative correlation between these traits readily evolved.
Furthermore, as the cost of punishment increased, essentially magnifying fitness differences
and selection within groups, the more “selfish” punishers became. However, as the number
of iterations increased (rounds spent in groups between mixing), thereby increasing the
strength of group selection, the more “altruistic” punishers became. In general, selfish
punishers offset the costs of punishment through the exploitation of altruists, maximizing
their fitness within groups (Nakamaru and Iwasa 2006, Eldakar et al. 2007, Eldakar and
Wilson 2008), while altruistic punishers benefit indirectly through maximizing group
fitness.
Previous models have focused on the differences between the punishment strategies and
considered them as exclusive to particular conditions (Nakamaru and Iwasa 2006, Eldakar et
al. 2007, Eldakar and Wilson 2008). These differences in within- and between-group
advantages however make selfish punishers better suited to invade selfish populations, while
their altruistic counterparts thrive in populations with high frequencies of altruism (Eldakar
and Wilson 2008). Thus, although these punishment strategies appeared mutually exclusive,
here we propose another possibility; that they represent transitional stages in the evolution of
enforcement.
In predominantly selfish populations, punishers bear immense costs to purge selfishness
from groups. However, when punishment takes the form of cheaters targeting other cheaters,
this competition amongst cheaters transforms selfishness to a self-limiting strategy, fostering
an increase in altruism in the population. With altruism established and cheating curtailed,
the need/cost of punishment is reduced causing selection to favor groups of high
cooperation, so that selfish punishers ultimately reduce group fitness compared with groups
enforced by altruistic punishment. Thus, from chaotic beginnings, a little hypocrisy may go
a long way in producing large-scale cooperation.
Here, we test the hypothesis that the evolutionary success of selfish punishers in
predominantly selfish populations establishes conditions that favor the subsequent evolution
and transition of enforcement to altruistic punishment. We use agent-based simulations to
determine the invasion potential of these punishment strategies in isolation as well as
transitional forms under various conditions.
The model
Here we present both an analytical and agent based simulation model. The analytical model
provides a guide to the construction of the agent based simulation, and is not intended to
represent the mean experience of all individuals of a given strategy or population-level
outcomes. The simulation is based on the behavior and interaction of individual agents, thus
the purpose of the analytical model is to illustrate what occurs from the perspective of an
individual within a given group (within group selection), not accounting for the average
fitness of each strategy across groups given a set of population frequencies (within and
between group selection). The simulation occurs in a large interacting multigroup population
of agents. Therefore, the average fitness of each strategy is the result of the average
experience of all individual agents of that strategy in the overall multigroup population.
The simulation model was implemented using the agent based modeling program Netlogo,
which is freely available for download (for Netlogo program see http://ccl.northwestern.edu/
netlogo/, and for code of the simulation model see Dryad repository: doi:10.5061/
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dryad.jg081). We composed an N-person evolutionary game theoretical model based on the
standard public goods game in the experimental economics literature (Fehr and Gachter
2000). The model begins with a population (size = N) with individuals that are either
altruistic or selfish, and punish or do not punish. Individuals associate in a large number of
randomly formed groups (group size = n) and interact for a number of iterations (I) of a two-
phase public goods game. During the initial phase, all individuals acquire a resource of the
value (R), with altruists contributing this resource towards the group, whereas their selfish
counterparts keep the resource for themselves. Contributions towards the group by the
altruists (number of altruists = na) are then multiplied by a value (m>1) and then distributed
equally amongst all group members (including the altruists). This is relevant to a biological
situation involving social animals, as the combined effort of a group will yield a greater
return than the sum of what individuals can accomplish alone.
After the cooperation phase, the fitness of altruists (ws) and selfish individuals (ws) are
represented by equations 1 and 2 respectively. Individuals maximize their fitness within
groups by selfishly withholding the resource, while overall group fitness is maximized by
altruism, typifying the classic struggle between altruism and selfishness.
(1)
(2)
Each round, the cooperation phase is followed by the punishment phase in which individuals
can pay a cost to expel selfish group members from social interactions. The overall cost of
punishment paid by each punisher in each round is the product of the cost of punishment (C)
and the number of selfish individuals in the group (ns), although a selfish punisher do not
punish him/herself. Therefore, when considering both phases of interaction, the overall
fitness of altruistic (ap) and selfish punishers (sp) are represented by eq 3 and 4 respectively,
with altruistic non-punishers and selfish non-punishers fitness represented by eq 1 and 2
since they do not bear the costs of punishment.
(3)
(4)
Punishment results in the expulsion of cheaters from the social interactions of the group
based on the probability of not escaping detection by all punishers. Although punishment is
modeled by ejecting individuals from groups, punishment can be considered as either
complete removal from the group, or merely expulsion from only particular social
interactions of the group (e.g. not interacting in group foraging while otherwise remaining in
the group). The probability of a single punisher detecting and punishing a given cheater is
represented by the term (D) which can vary from 0 – 1. Therefore the chance of escaping a
given punisher is (1-D), while the chance of escaping detection by all punishers in the group
(np) is (1-D)np, leaving the overall chance of punishment represented by equation 5. If
punished, individuals are excluded from all subsequent rounds of the game for that
generation, and replaced by individuals drawn randomly from a pool based on the initial
Eldakar et al. Page 4
Evolution. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2014 June 01.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
frequencies at the start of the current generation. The fact that the replacements play fewer
rounds than the original members is immaterial because they still contribute to fitness
differentials of the overall strategies in the total population. In addition, individuals die if
possessing a fitness of ≤ 0 at any point, in which case they are replaced in the same manner
as those expelled.
(5)
If expelled, punished individuals receive a payoff of (R) reduced by the costs of solitary
behavior (S; 0 ≤ S ≤ 1), and receive this payoff for the remaining iterations of the game (e).
Since punishment occurs each round, an individual excluded earlier in the generation will
have a greater value of (e) than a different individual expelled in a later round, resulting in
proportionately less of their payoff from solitary behavior. This is biologically reasonable as
it is assumed an animal evolved for social living will fare worse than those benefiting from
sociality. Thus, a selfish non-punisher’s and selfish punisher’s overall fitness for all
iterations (I), is the sum of the payoff acquired during the iterations not expelled (I-e) and
the payoff acquired during the rounds expelled (e), represented by equations 6 and 7,
respectively.
(6)
(7)
Following the completion of all iterations, all individuals (including those expelled)
reproduce asexually in proportion to their relative fitness (resource acquired) in the overall
multigroup population (individual fitness – mean fitness) and immediately die. Offspring
adopt the strategy of the parent with a chance of mutating to any strategies at a fixed rate
(see table 1 for baseline conditions) and disperse to a random group to begin the next cycle
of interactions (see fig 1 for pictorial model summary).
Invasion of enforcement: altruistic punishers
Here we first present the analytical conditions in which altruistic punishment can maintain
altruism within groups (with selfish punishment absent), then present multigroup
simulations. Due to both first- and second-order costs of altruistic punishment, the
conditions for the invasion of altruistic punishers are limited (Yamagishi 1986, Bowles and
Gintis 2002, 2004, Fehr 2004). Furthermore, because altruistic punishers are altruists, as the
initial frequency of altruistic punishers is increased, the corresponding initial frequencies of
selfishness must decrease (i.e. frequency of altruistic punishers must be ≥ frequency of
selfishness), thus reducing the testable range of predominantly selfish populations that
altruistic punishment can invade compared to selfish punishers (fig. 2).
For altruistic punishment to outcompete selfish non-punishers within a single group, the
costs of punishing cheaters must be less than the benefits lost by not remaining in the group
for expelled cheaters (eq. 8).
(8)
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Although a within group perspective is insightful, this simplistic formulation does not
consider the consequences of competition at the group level. Within groups, altruistic non-
punishers undermine punishment, however groups policed by altruistic punishers fare better
than those without punishers. This is readily observed when comparing the relative fitness
differences over a single generation in scenarios when altruistic punishment effectively
maintains cooperation in the mulitgroup model (fig 3a). Here we see that altruistic punishers
initially have the lowest relative fitness due to exploitation by both selfish individuals as
well as non-punishers. Over subsequent iterations, the relative fitness of both altruistic
punishers and altruistic non-punishers increases and surpasses selfish non-punishers as these
selfish individuals are expelled from the group (thus, obtaining a reduced payoff).
Eventually altruistic punishers surpass altruistic non-punishers as the differences between
groups become magnified through enforcement. However, as expected, under our baseline
conditions, altruistic punishment requires either high levels of altruism or correspondingly
low costs of punishment to successfully invade (fig 4).
Invasion of enforcement: selfish punishers
In our previous models on the evolution of punishment, we demonstrated that punishers who
cheat during the cooperation phase are more likely to invade than those that do not (Eldakar
et al. 2007, Eldakar and Wilson 2008), as cheating (not cooperating) can directly offset the
costs of punishment. For selfish punishment to outcompete selfishness within a group, the
costs of punishment must be less than the difference in resources earned from remaining in
the group and being expelled (eq. 9).
(9)
When comparing the relative fitness differences within multigroup populations policed by
selfish punishment (with altruistic punishment absent) the relative fitness of selfish
punishers as well as altruistic non-punishers begin low due to the costs of punishment and
the costs of exploitation respectively (see fig. 3b). However, over time their relative fitness
rises to surpass selfish non-punishers as they are expelled and overall exploitation is
reduced. Selfish punishers, however, also recover the costs of punishment by exploiting the
remaining altruists. As expected, under baseline conditions, selfish punishers invade
predominantly selfish populations more readily than their altruistic counterparts (figure 4).
The transition of punishment
We predicted that selfish punishment and altruistic punishment can constitute transitional
stages of enforcement over time. The conditions for which altruistic punishment
outcompetes selfish punishment within groups resemble the similar conditions in which
selfish punishment outcompetes selfish non-punishers, based on whether the costs of
punishment is less than the fitness lost from expulsion (eq. 10).
(10)
In a typical simulation run of multigroup populations under conditions in which selfish
punishers can successfully invade and maintain altruism, plots tracking frequency over
multiple generations demonstrates how the negative frequency dependence of selfish
punishers ultimately limits their overall frequency in the population (fig 5). However, with
cheating curtailed, altruistic punishment successfully invades from mutation and replaces
selfish punishment. This transition of enforcement strategies ultimately drives altruism to
fixation in all populations in which selfish punishers can initially invade, thus resolving the
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most limiting constraint of altruistic punishment theory, the ability to invade predominantly
selfish populations. Here we now explore the parameter space of the model variables on the
evolution of punishment in simulation of multigroup populations.
Cost of punishment
The cost of punishing transgressors is a crucial variable when considering the evolution of
enforcement. Low cost punishment in the form of gossip (Wilson et al. 2000, Kniffin and
Wilson 2005) and the potent negative consequences of having a poor reputation (Milinski et
al. 2002) can be extremely effective; however, punishment may often take the form of more
costly physical encounters as well (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995). To account for the
variation across social systems, we varied the costs of punishment from baseline values
(20% of the resources allocated each iteration), to values of 40% and 5%, respectively.
When varying the costs of punishment, not surprisingly, increasing punishment costs
reduced the effectiveness and evolvability of punishment, particularly hindering altruistic
punishment as high punishment costs can plummet fitness to negative values/death (fig. 6).
Reducing the costs of punishment, however, produced the opposite outcome and favored the
evolvability of altruistic punishment over selfish punishment. This finding is not surprising
when considering the different selection regimes that favor these alternative strategies.
Reducing the costs of punishment favors all punishers by increasing their ability to purge
selfishness from the group. Whereas the primary advantage of selfish punishment is the
reduced relative costs of punishment compared to their altruistic counterparts, this advantage
is minimized when costs of punishment are exceedingly low and the disadvantages of selfish
punishment (reducing group productivity and vulnerability to expulsion) remain unchanged.
This may also provide further insights to why gossip is most effective when aimed to benefit
the group as opposed to when perceived as self-serving (Wilson et al. 2000, Hess and Hagen
2006).
Costs of solitary behavior
Social animals depend on their social group for many fitness influencing behaviors such as
foraging, protection, raising offspring, and mating opportunities (see review, Krause and
Ruxton 2002), thus being expelled from social interactions can result in tremendous fitness
costs for the excluded individual. Here we altered the costs of exile by varying the degree
the individual’s resource allotment each round is reduced (S) from baseline values of 0.5, to
values 0.3 and 0.7. To review, punished individuals do not take part in social interactions,
thus once excluded receive a payoff of R*S for the remaining iterations of the generation.
As expected, increasing the fitness of discrepancy between expulsion and remaining in a
group increases the effectiveness/evolvability of both punishment strategies (fig. 7).
Iterations
The length individuals stay within groups is a crucial variable to many social systems. The
longer individuals stay within their social groups, the greater the potential strength of group
selection. The increased duration of group life has two major effects on selection in the
overall population: 1) the longer individuals associate in groups (between population mixing
phases), the greater the ability of punishers to remove cheaters and reduce within-group
variance relative to between-group variance and 2) the longer that variation is partitioned at
the between-group versus within-group level, the greater the strength of selection at the level
of the group in the overall population.
In randomly mixing populations, individuals can readily exploit groups and escape
consequences as the shared fate of individuals within groups becomes less relevant. For
example, in scenarios such as the tragedy of the commons, individuals selfishly exploit a
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common resource to the detriment of all group members. The longer individuals associate in
groups with like strategies, the more the benefits of altruism are shared by altruists, and the
consequences of selfishness are shared by other selfish individuals.
Here we varied the number of iterations (I) within a generation from the baseline value of
10, to 6 and 14. As expected, increasing the duration of group association increased the
effectiveness of both punishment strategies to invade populations and establish altruism
while reducing the duration of group association inhibited the invasion of punishment (fig.
8). Although increased group duration (and thereby group selection) is expected to favor
altruistic punishment and potentially hinder selfish punishers, this would also dramatically
aid selfish punishers when sufficiently rare as they benefit from the role of exclusive
exploiter for even longer periods.
Group size
Group sizes vary within and between species (Krause and Ruxton 2002) as well as in
evolutionary models from simple dyadic interactions (Trivers 1971) to large group scenarios
(Boyd and Richerson 1992, Boyd et al. 2003). A prominent feature of group size is its effect
on the partitioning of variance within and between groups (Aviles et al. 2002). As groups
decrease in size, the probability that the variance within groups equals that of the overall
population is reduced. Conversely, as groups increase in size, they are more likely to
resemble the overall population, effectively reducing variance between groups. Thus all
things considered, reducing group size is typically thought to favor group selected
behaviors. Another feature of group size with respect to punishment strategies is that
punishers can more readily influence within group variation as expelling the same
percentage of cheaters from a small group requires less effort than in larger groups.
Therefore as expected, reducing group size aided the evolution of punishment, while
increasing group size reduced its effectiveness (fig. 9).
Discussion
Punishment is difficult to explain because, like altruism, those who benefit from the
behavior do not necessarily share in the costs. This is especially true for altruistic
punishment, as the two-fold relative fitness cost of altruism and punishment makes invasion
of predominately selfish populations exceedingly problematic. Here we show that this
evolutionary obstacle is readily resolved if punishment originates with selfishness. In
general, selfish punishers are better adapted to invade selfish populations, as they benefit
from the role of exclusive exploiter (and protector) of flocks of altruists. This benefit,
however, is undercut once selfish punishers become sufficiently abundant, and competition
between them ultimately limits their frequency in the population. Thus, once selfishness is
effectively curtailed, and the necessity of punishment is reduced, the selective advantage of
altruistic punishment is realized.
The stabilization of altruism from originally selfish populations by selfish punishment
strategies has been quite successful in human societies. The origins of the mafia began in
areas devoid of government policing (Lupo 2009). Where official policing was incapable of
maintaining order, prosperous families often associated with criminal activity became the
unofficial enforcers of order. Criminal organizations reduced crime and supplied public
services in some communities in the United States before cooperative/less exploitative
governmental policing were able to assume control (Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995, Lupo
2009). Furthermore, the aforementioned example of the Castillians provides an ideal
example where the selfish punishers themselves transition to more altruistic defenders.
These individuals, initially thought of as bands of thugs, were later revered as honorable
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defenders of the commons once the competition between other groups became paramount
(Bison 1994).
Although our model suggests that selfish punishers are entirely replaced by their altruistic
counterparts, it is likely that natural populations are not as stable and a mix of strategies may
always remain present to some extent. Fluctuations in density, cost/benefit structure, group
size, and group longevity, may preserve populations where all strategies are maintained.
Furthermore, large scale trends at the level of governments may cycle independent of
smaller scale enforcement at the local level. Thus while human societies may resemble an
overall transition from totalitarian states to democratic republics, populations my
nevertheless encompass diverse punishment strategies in economic games (considering
studies that include selfish punishment Eldakar et al. 2006, O’Brien et al. in press), as well
as natural variation in genetic predispositions to punish transgressors (Mc Dermott et al.
2009).
The variation of enforcement strategies in natural populations may also depend on species
specific or context dependent parameters. One likely important parameter is the existence of
power asymmetries. In theoretical models, individuals are often assumed equivalent with
regards to their ability to carry out various strategies. However, considering natural selection
requires variation in strategies for evolution to occur, individuals should also vary in their
effectiveness of performing these various strategies. For example, in pigtailed macaques
(Macaca nemestrina), third-party punishment which reduces within group conflict (Flack et
al. 2005) and stabilizes social niches (Flack et al. 2006), is performed by the more powerful
individuals in the group. In rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), individuals are punished for
failing to announce their discovery of food. However, high ranking males were not punished
for their own deception yet remained those most vigilant against other transgressors (Hauser
and Marler 1993), further demonstrating how particular strategies are associated with certain
individuals. This may be especially true for selfish punishment. Human examples of selfish
punishment often associate punishment behavior with those most capable of performing the
very strategy they are defending against. In other words, it may take a thief to catch a thief.
Economists Russel Sobel and Brian Osoba (2009) have proposed that youth gangs form in
response to violence, such that in regions where governmental enforcement is absent, violent
gangs form to effectively reduce further violence. The mafia is thought to have also emerged
due to a lack of government protection. Organized crime is just that, crime, however, the
presence of the mafia functionally reduces other sources of crime and improves the quality
of the region they both protect and exploit (Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995; Salvatore Lupo
2009). Thus while we have not included power asymmetries or increased efficacy of
cheaters finding/punishing other cheaters in this model, it appears that these are important
components of selfish punishment and may partially explain why selfish punishers are
ultimately always replaced by altruistic punishment in our model.
Another feature of our model that may have also ushered in the eventual and complete
replacement of punishment strategies was the use of discrete instead of continuous traits.
Selfish punishers by definition are individuals that punish yet acquire exclusive benefits for
this behavior that are otherwise unavailable to non punishers. In our previous model using
continuous traits, the initially independent traits of altruism and punishment became
negatively correlated over time (Eldakar et al. 2007). Although the strength of this negative
correlation varied across conditions (group size, cost of punishment, and iterations), we
considered the presence of a negative association between altruism and punishment as
evidence of selfish punishment. Because this creates a very broad categorization of selfish
punishment, here we opted to use discrete traits to eliminate any ambiguity regarding
punishment types and observe which conditions favor particular strategies in their simplest
form. Therefore, it may be predicted that a continuous trait model would have stabilized at a
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middle point between the two strategies. However, using discrete strategies we were able to
show the fundamental differences between the two punishment types and demonstrate their
transitional relationship in producing altruistic populations.
Since the inclusion of punishment in social evolutionary models, there has been an
explosion of punishment strategies and discussion on how these strategies interact. This is
most evident in recent models (e.g. Rand and Nowak 2011, Garcia and Traulsen 2012) that
include all punishment strategies such as altruistic punishment, selfish punishment,
antisocial (punishers target altruists), and even loner strategies that do not partake in the
social exchanges (cooperation/selfishness) yet can punish and be punished by others. These
models result in various conclusions that may confuse as to how punishment influences
social evolution, and what it means when models involving the same strategies produce very
different outcomes. Altruism can evolve in population structures with stronger selection
between groups than within groups (strategies cluster in groups compared with a randomly
mixing population). This is because a continuously random mixing population is effectively
a single large group, favoring selfish individuals based on their within group advantage. If
individuals stay in groups for longer periods, selfish individuals suffer from the
consequences of decreased group fitness (productivity), compared to individuals within
more altruistic groups. The longer individuals stay in groups, the greater the differences
between groups matters. Punishment of selfishness augments altruism in the middle ground,
because it reduces the within group advantage of selfishness over altruism (weakens
competition within groups). Strategies that undermine punishment of selfishness (such as
antisocial punishment) will have the opposite effect. This is because the punishment of
altruists magnifies the competitive disadvantage of altruism within groups. While altruistic
punishment and antisocial punishment are still considered “punishment”, they are very
different in their influence on within- and between-group competition, and the balance of
within- and between-group selection.
Population structures that increase the relative strength of selection between groups will
favor altruistic punishment (e.g. Boyd et al. 2003) or even altruism without the need for
punishment (Wilson 1975, Wilson and Wilson 2007). Conversely, population structures that
increase the relative strength of selection within groups will favor strategies such as
selfishness, antisocial punishment (Hauert et al. 2007, Garcia and Traulsen 2012), and even
behaviors produced by extreme within-group selection (e.g. spite, see Hamilton 1964,
Gardener and West 2004, West and Gardener 2010). Anything in between may result in a
mixture of all strategies. Thus, a single model can produce pure altruism (strategies that
benefit the group at a cost to self), or pure spite (strategies that harm the group at a cost to
self, but actor has a reduced fitness loss compared to recipients) by only altering the
population structure. And a model can produce altruistic punishment, or destroy altruistic
punishment through antisocial punishment in the same manner. To understand why
particular models favor alternative forms of punishment, one must first understand how
selection acts within and between groups, and how punishment mediates this balance in
general.
Summary
In this model we set out to demonstrate how enforcement can invade and ultimately stabilize
altruism. Previous models have shown the effectiveness of altruistic punishment and have
also addressed its evolutionary pitfalls of initial invasion. For instance, features such as
conformance bias transmission Henrich and Boyd (2001), coalitional enforcement (Bingham
1999), coordination (Boyd et al. 2010, Perc 2012), opting out of social interactions (see
Hauert et al. 2007, Garcia and Traulsen 2012), and reputation (Brandt et al. 2003) have all
dramatically improved the ability of altruistic punishment to both avoid second-order costs
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and invade more selfish populations. However, these added features often carry additional
evolutionary requirements such as cognition, or other behavioral features such as the
willingness to coordinate and reputation networks to already be available when altruistic
punishment emerges. Although these are all probable features present in humans, here we
took the opposite approach to resolving the dilemma of punishment, steering away from
adding complexity. Instead, we looked to the most parsimonious yet ignored starting point,
the initially selfish population, and have shown how hawks can give rise to doves.
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Figure 1.
The population begins at set initial frequencies of strategies and individuals disperse
randomly to groups (size n). Individuals interact within groups involving a cooperation
phase and punishment for a set number of iterations (I). Following each iteration, individuals
may remain in groups, die due to a fitness of ≤ 0, or be banished to the punishment patch
(socially excluded) if the chance of being punished 1-(1-Dnp) is greater than a random value
(X). Once banished, the punished individuals acquire a fitness of R*S for the remaining
iterations (e). Groups losing interacting members to either death and/or punishment are filled
to the set group size randomly by individuals drawn from the population stock of the same
frequencies from the beginning of the generation. At the conclusion of the iterations,
individuals from both the interacting population and the punishment patch reproduce
asexually (with a chance of mutation M) in proportion to their relative fitness in the overall
population and die, thus resetting the population frequencies and beginning a new
generation. For simulation runs, the frequency of punishment was varied every 0.01, from
0.02 to 0.05, and every 0.025 from 0.025 - 0.975 and the frequency of altruism was varied
every 0.01 from 0.01 to the limits of the testable range as shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2.
Testable invasion ranges for altruistic and selfish punishment. The region above the solid
line reveals the range of possible altruism and punishment combinations for the invasion of
altruistic punishment. Points below the solid line comprise conditions by which the initial
frequency of altruistic punishers is > the initial frequency of altruism, therefore an invalid
combination. The testable range of selfish punishment resides below the dotted line, whereas
points above the line are invalid as initial frequency of selfish punishers is > the initial
frequency of selfishness (1 – frequency of altruism).
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Figure 3.
For simulations involving altruistic punishment (a), at the start of a generation, altruistic
punishment has the lowest relative fitness due to first- and second-order costs. However,
over time, altruistic punishers and altruistic non-punishers surpass the fitness of selfish non-
punishers, with altruistic punishers ultimately having the greatest fitness due to their group-
level advantage. Conversely, for simulations involving selfish punishment (b), selfish
punishers have relative advantage over altruistic non-punishers at the start of the generation.
However, over time the relative fitness of selfish punishers and altruistic non-punishers rises
to surpass selfish non-punishers as they are expelled. The competition between selfish
punishers ultimately limits their fitness relative to altruistic non-punishers due. Note that
generations under baseline last 10 iterations, with effects here shown beyond 10 to reveal
further consequences of group selection. Error bars indicate standard error of 50 replications
of single generation runs.
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Figure 4.
Invasion ranges for altruistic and selfish punishment in baseline conditions. The region
above the altruistic punishment line indicates initial population frequencies altruistic
punishment can successfully invade. The region above the selfish punishment line indicate
initial population frequencies in which selfish punishment can invade. As expected, selfish
punishment was able to invade a wider range of selfish populations than altruistic
punishment. Invasion conditions were tested 10 times for combinations of punishment and
altruism with the lines denoting the respective borders in which altruism was established in
100% of runs.
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Figure 5.
Time series plots comparing the frequency of competing strategies over time. Under
baseline conditions with 22% altruism and 10% punishment, (a) selfish punishment can
successfully invade and establish altruism. Ultimately selfish punishers and altruistic non-
punishers form a stable equilibrium with altruism maintained at ~75% of the total
population. Under the same conditions (b) altruistic punishment cannot successfully invade
and establish altruism. However, under the same conditions as (a), but allowing for mutation
to altruistic punishment, altruistic punishment successfully emerge and replace selfish
punishment. With the initial invasion of selfish punishment and subsequent invasion of
altruistic punishment, altruism is ultimately established and maintained at >99% of the total
population. Note that mutation to any strategy is permitted in all models, however in both (a)
and (b) runs, the alternative punishment strategy is excluded. Error bars indicate standard
error of 50 replications.
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Figure 6.
Invasion plots demonstrate how decreasing the costs of punishment (C) aids the invasion of
both punishment strategies, while increasing the costs of punishment hinders the success of
punishment. Interestingly, reducing the costs of punishment favors altruistic punishment (a)
more so than selfish punishment (b). The lines indicate the border above which punishment
can successfully invade and establish altruism in 100% of runs. The dotted lines indicate
baseline conditions for comparison.
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Figure 7.
Invasion plots demonstrate how varying fitness effects from expulsion from social
interactions to solitary behavior (S) influence the effectiveness of punishment. When
expulsion from group social interactions is more costly (reducing S), punishment overall is
more effective for both strategies. When expulsion results in only a minor drop in fitness,
punishment loses its effectiveness and therefore more difficult to evolve. Overall, across
values of (S) selfish punishment remains more effective at establishing altruism in
predominantly selfish populations (b) than altruistic punishment (a). The lines indicate the
border above which punishment can successfully invade and establish altruism in 100% of
runs. The dotted lines indicate baseline conditions for comparison.
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Figure 8.
Invasion plots demonstrate how varying iterations (I) influence the effectiveness of
punishment. Increasing iterations, functionally increases group selection favoring both
punishment strategies, while decreasing iterations favors purely selfish strategies. Overall,
across values of (I) selfish punishment remains more effective at establishing altruism in
predominantly selfish populations (b) than altruistic punishment (a). The lines indicate the
border above which punishment can successfully invade and establish altruism in 100% of
runs. The dotted lines indicate baseline conditions for comparison.
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Figure 9.
Invasion plots demonstrate how varying group size (n) effects influences the effectiveness of
punishment. Decreasing group size increases the effectiveness of punishment to reduce the
phenotypic variance within groups, as smaller groups means less individuals to potentially
punish. When group size is increased, it is more costly for punishers to effectively purge out
cheaters. Overall, across values of (n) selfish punishment remains more effective at
establishing altruism in predominantly selfish populations (b) than altruistic punishment (a).
The lines indicate the border above which punishment can successfully invade and establish
altruism in 100% of runs. The dotted lines indicate baseline conditions for comparison.
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Table 1
Definition of variables with baseline values. Simulations were terminated when stabilized by either fixing
(>99% of the total population) for altruism or selfishness in the population, typically within 100 generations.
Subsets of simulations were extended beyond the point of fixation for 1000 generation, assuring long-term
stability. Populations of 10,000 individuals or greater produced equivalent results such that drift did not
significantly influence outcomes.
Variable Baseline Definition
N 10,000 Total population size
n 5 Group size
I 10 Iterations played within each group per generation
R 10 Resources allocated each iteration
C 2 Cost of punishing each selfish individual
D 0.7 The probability of a single punisher detecting and
punishing a given cheater
S 0.5 Cost of reduced fitness due to solitary behavior each
round.
M 1−5 Mutation rate
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